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DUE PROCESS AT IN-PRISON DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
The question as to the procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due
process at in-prison disciplinary proceedings is a question that must be exam-
ined and resolved before penal institutions can effectively perform their re-
habilitative and custodial functions. However, it must be kept in mind that
there are no easy answers to this question. Those persons who would provide
extensive procedural guarantees for prisoners, with no regard for the practical
problems which those guarantees create for prison officials, perform as great
a disservice as those who would provide prisoners with no protection against
arbitrary action by prison officials. It is the purpose of this comment to
outline the development of this area of the law and to examine the approaches
taken by several federal courts as they have attempted to balance the rights
of prisoners who have been charged with violations of prison regulations and
the interests of prison officials who are charged with the discipline and se-
curity of penal institutions.
II. DEVELOPMENT
Federal courts have not attempted detailed analyses of procedural due
process at prison disciplinary proceedings until relatively recently. Perhaps
the primary reason for the federal courts' reluctance to become involved in
this area has been their recognition that a wide discretion must be left in the
hands of federal and state prison officials as they administer the day to day
operations of penal institutions.1 Specifically, federal courts have recognized
that prison discipline is an area which more properly remains within the com-
petence of prison administrative officials.2 Moreover, since administrative
officials of the executive branch of government are charged with the main-
tenance of the discipline and security of their respective institutions, federal
courts have recognized that these officials must be provided with a wide dis-
cretion in order that discipline and security be maintained.3
On the other hand, federal courts have noted that prisoners do not lose
all of the rights and privileges that are enjoyed by members of a free society. 4
1. Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775, 779 (4th Cir. 1968); Graham v.
Willingham, 384 F.2d 367, 368 (10th Cir. 1967); Kostal v. Tinsley, 337 F.2d 845,
846 (10th Cir. 1964); Rentfrow v. Carter, 296 F. Supp. 301, 302 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
2. Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1967); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d
850, 851 (9th Cir. 1951).
3. Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775, 779 (4th Cir. 1968); Childs v.
Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1963).
4. Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571 (8th Cir. 1968).
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Generally, it has been held that while incarceration necessitates the with-
drawal of many rights and privileges, certain fundamental rights are retained
by the prisoner, subject, of course, to appropriate limitations commensurate
with his imprisonment.8
These rather general statements of the conflicting interests of prison of-
ficials and the prisoners over whom they exercise authority are prevalent
in many of the decisions which attempted to deal with the circumstances sur-
rounding the discipline of inmates at federal and state penal institutions. 6
These decisions, most of which were decided during the 1960's, did not at-
tempt to deal with the specific requirements which procedural due process im-
posed on the disciplinary action taken by prison officials. Rather, they spoke
in general terms of the prison administrators' need for discretion in maintain-
ing discipline and the fundamental rights retained by prisoners.7
The reluctance of the federal courts to become involved in the circum-
stances surrounding the disciplinary actions taken against federal -and state
prisoners manifested itself in a "hands off" doctrine8 being applied to such
cases. This doctrine was to the effect that unless a court could find some
clear violation of a retained fundamental right, the discretion of the prison
administrator precluded judicial review of the prison disciplinary action and
the circumstances surrounding it. Thus, federal courts usually reviewed pris-
oners' complaints which alleged that disciplinary action violated constitutional
rights only where it was shown that the action taken was violative of the
Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment, or
where the action was capriciously and arbitrarily imposed by prison adminis-
trators and was, therefore, an abuse of administrative discretion. 10
While the federal courts recognized that a capricious and arbitrary im-
position of disciplinary action by prison officials was violative of due process,11
no federal court dealt specifically with the requirements of procedural due
process at in-prison disciplinary proceedings until 1969. Consequently, all of
the federal court decisions which dealt with due process at in-prison disci-
plinary proceedings prior to 1969 (and many which were decided after
1969) are characterized by the absence of any attempt to establish definite
5. Id.
6. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Sewell v.
Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1961); Vida v. Cage, 385 F.2d 408 (6th Cir.
1967).
7. Id.
8. Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, 994 (4th Cir. 1966).
9. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S. Ct. 1049, 926 Ed. 1356 (1947);
Bums v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1970); Howard v. Swenson, 426 F.2d
277 (8th Cir. 1970); Winsby v. Walsh, 321 F. Supp. 523 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
10. Theriault v. Blackwell, 437 F.2d 76, 77 (5th Cir. 1971); Burns v. Swenson,
430 F.2d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 1970); Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th
Cir. 1968); Graham v. Wiligham, 384 F.2d 367, 368 (10th Cir. 1967).
11. id.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
procedural guidelines which would be necessary to satisfy procedural due
process at such proceedings. Rather, these pre-1969 decisions all contain the
general substantive due process discussion of the discretion which is left in
the hands of prison administrators and the need to balance this discretion
against the substantive right allegedly violated by the circumstances of the
disciplinary proceeding.
However, in December, 1969, the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusettes decided Nolan v. Scafati.12 In so doing, the dis-
trict court began by presenting the same general discussion of due process
which characterized all of the earlier federal court decisions dealing with
the question.' 3 However, the court went on to recognize that a procedural
due process claim had also been presented and assumed, without deciding,14
that in order for procedural due process requirements to be satisfied at in-
prison discipline proceedings, the prison officials must:
(1) advise the prisoner of the charge of misconduct, (2) inform
the prisoner of the nature of the evidence against him, (3) afford
the prisoner an opportunity to be heard in his own defense, and(4) reach its determination upon the basis of substantial evi-
dence.1i
The court then went on to discuss the prisoner's claims that procedural
due process also required that he had the right to have an attorney present
and the right to cross-examine the complaining guard during the disciplinary
hearing which found him guilty of the violation of a prison regulation and sen-
tenced him to solitary confinement. The court held that procedural due pro-
cess required neither. In so holding, the court noted that society has an im-
portant interest in maintaining the authority of prison officials. 16 Thus, the
court recognized that any discussion of procedural due process requirements
at prison disciplinary proceedings must involve the same balancing of in-
terests that characterized the earlier federal court decisions which had dealt
in terms of substantive due process.
Many federal court decisions rendered after the Nolan decision con-
tinued to view prisoner complaints which alleged that disciplinary actions vio-
lated constitutional rights only in terms of substantive due process, and re-
fused to review prison administrative action absent a showing that officials
had acted arbitrarily or capriciously.' 7 However, several federal courts,
12. 306 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Mass. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 430 F.2d 548
(1st Cir. 1970).
13. Id. at 2-3.
14. ld. at 3.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 4.
17. Theriault v. Blackwell, 437 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel.
Gallagher, 326 F. Supp. 387 (D. Minn. 1971); Winsby v. Walsh, 321 F. Supp. 523
(C.D. Calif. 1971); Queen v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 307 F. Supp. 841
(D. South Car. 1970).
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following the example that Nolan had set, began to focus on the disciplinary
hearings conducted at state and federal prisons and examine the procedures
available to prisoners by which they could defend against charges that they
had violated prison regulations. For example, in Kritsky v. McGinnis,'8
the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York cited
Nolan and held that a prisoner had not been afforded procedural due process
where he was not given an opportunity to be heard in his own defense at a
prison disciplinary hearing.19
While most of the decisions which followed Nolan did not expand the
requirements necessary to satisfy procedural due process at prison disciplin-
ary hearings, at least one federal court went further. In Sostre v. Rocke-
feller,20 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
entered an order which perpetually restrained prison officials from:
2) Placing plaintiff (Sostre) in punitive segregation or subjecting
him to any other punishment as a result of which he loses ac-
crued good time credit or is unable to earn good time credit
without:
a. giving him, in advance of a hearing, a written copy of
any charges made against him, citing the written rule or regu-
lation which it is charged he has violated;
b. granting him a recorded hearing before a disinterested
official where he will be entitled to cross-examine his accusers
and to call witnesses on his own behalf;
c. granting him the right to retain counsel or to appoint a
counsel substitute; 21
d. giving him, in writing, the decision of the hearing officer
in which is briefly set forth the evidence upon which it is
based, the reasons for the decisions, and the legal basis for
the punishment imposed. 22
The reaction to this order was not favorable. Winsby v. Walsh 2 flatly re-
fused to follow it in so far as it required "that a prisoner ought to be given a
full hearing on notice and with counsel present before he can be disciplined. '24
Other decisions, while favorably citing the holding that procedural due pro-
cess requirements are applicable to prison disciplinary hearings, failed to re-
quire the presence of retained counsel or counsel substitute, advanced writ-
ten notice of the regulation allegedly violated, the right to call witnesses or
18. 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
19. Id. at 1250; See also, Carter v. McGinnis, 320 F. Supp. 1092 (W.D.N.Y.
1970); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971).
20. 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub. nom. Sostre v. McGin-
nis, 442 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1971).
21. Counsel substitute in this context generally refers to the assistance of another
inmate at prison disciplinary hearings who is more familiar with the procedure than
the inmate charged with the regulation violation.
22. 312 F. Supp. at 884.
23. 321 F. Supp. 523 (C.D. Calif. 1971).
24. Id. at 526.
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the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 25 Rather, these decisions enun-
ciated more general statements as to the requirements necessary to satisfy
procedural due process. For example in Carothers v. Follette,2 6 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that "the
essential elements of fundamental procedural fairness-advance notice of any
serious charge and an opportunity to present evidence before a relatively ob-
jective tribunal" 27 could not be denied to prisoners at disciplinary hearings.
The fact that the Carothers holding is couched in such general terms is
significant. The Nolan2s and Sostre29 district court holdings had specified
those procedures which procedural due process required. This greater de-
gree of specificity in such holdings operates to decrease the discretion which is
left in the hands of prison administrative officials. As will be recalled, federal
courts are not eager to interfere with this discretion. Thus, the Carothers
decision seems to be an attempt to reconcile the new proposition that proce-
dural due process guarantees are applicable to prison disciplinary hearings
with the well established proposition that prison officials must retain a wide
discretion in the day to day operation of prisons in order to maintain disci-
pline and security. This attempt to reconcile these propositions with a general
statement of what procedures satisfied procedural due process reached its
zenith in Sostre v. McGinnis.30
In Sostre, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed that portion of the order entered by the district court in Sostre v.
Rockefeleral which specified the procedure necessary to satisfy procedural
due process at prison disciplinary hearings. In so doing, the court of ap-
peals held that:
In most cases it would probably be difficult to find an inquiry
minimally fair and rational unless the prisoner were confronted
with the accusation, informed of the evidence against him . . .
and afforded a reasonable opportunity to explain his actions.3 2
Similarly, in the court's conclusion it noted that:
We would not lightly condone the absence of such basic safe-
guards against arbitrariness as adequate notice, an opportunity for
the prisoner to reply to charges lodged against him, and a reason-
able investigation into the relevant facts-at least in the cases of
substantial discipline. 33
25. Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Meola v. Fitz-
patrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971).
26. 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
27. Id. at 1028.
28. See note 12 supra.
29. See note 20 supra.
30. 442 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1971).
31. See note 20 supra.
32. 442 F.2d at 198.
33. Id. at 203.
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This general statement of the procedures required at prison disciplin-
ary hearings by procedural due process served three purposes. First, it re-
asserted the proposition that procedural due process was applicable to prison
disciplinary hearings. Secondly, it set down a broad general statement as
to what requirements were mandated by procedural due process. Thirdly,
it still left much discretion in the hands of prison officials to determine how
these requirements were to be implemented and the extent to which they were
to be implemented.
The fact that the federal courts were still very reluctant to limit the
discretion of prison officials was also made apparent in Sostre by the Second
Circuit. In addition, the decision set forth an explanation of this reluctance
which had been noticeably absent in the decisions which had preceded it.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained that since there was a
paucity of objective information dealing with the question as to whether formal
procedural due process requirements at prison disciplinary proceedings would
be detrimental or beneficial to prison officials in the maintenance of discipline
and security it was inappropriate for federal courts to limit these officials.34
In amplification, the Second Circuit noted:
We would not presume to fashion a constitutional harness of noth-
ing more than our guesses. It would be mere speculation for us
to decree that the effect of equipping prisoners with more elaborate
constitutional weapons against the administration of discipline by
prison authorities would be more soothing to the prison atmosphere
and rehabilitative of the prisoner or, on the other hand, more
disquieting and destructive of remedial ends. This is a judgment
entrusted to state officials, not federal judges.35
Despite the now well-settled proposition that procedural due process was
applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings and the attempt of one lower
federal court to define procedural guarantees with specificity, the "hands off"
doctrine was still alive and well in the Second Circuit.
III. Tm SEVENTH CIRCUIT
The Second Circuit's decision in Sostre v. McGinnis was adopted by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Adams v. Pate.36
However, in 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided Morrissey v.
Brewer.3 7 That decision was to have a profound effect on the Seventh Cir-
cuit's view as to the requirements of procedural due process at in-prison dis-
ciplinary hearings. In Morrissey, the Supreme Court had held that proce-
dural due process required that parolees, at parole revocation proceedings,
were entitled to:
34. Id. at 197.
35. Id.
36.- 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971).
37. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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a. written notice of the claimed violations of parole;
b. disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him;
c. (an) opportunity to be heard in person and to present wit-
nesses and documentary evidence;
d. the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (un-
less the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not
allowing confrontation);
e. a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional
parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers
or lawyers; and
f. a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied
on and reasons for revoking paroleA8
Although Morrissey did not deal specifically with the requirements of proce-
dural due process at in-prison disciplinary hearings, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit relied on it heavily when they handed down United States
ex rel. Miller v. Twomey,89 on May 16, 1973. At present, that decision is
the controlling authority on the requirements of procedural due process in
the Seventh Circuit and is the most extensive analysis of the subject to date
In Miller, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the Morrissey decision
had gone far to limit the discretion of prison officials in regard to parole
revocations. 4° With that in mind the court felt it "appropriate to reexamine
the extent to which the wide discretion of prison officials remains unreview-
able."' 41 Thus, rather than a statement of the reluctance to limit the discre-
tion of prison officials which had characterized so many of the federal court
decisions which had gone before, the Seventh Circuit, armed with Morrissey,
set out to examine the limits of that discretion in so far as it related to in-pri-
son disciplinary hearings. However, the court did note that while they
would examine this area of the discretion of prison officials, "a myriad of
problems of prison administration must remain beyond the scope of proper
judical concern." '42
Since the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit read Morrissey to re-
quire that due process is required before any "substantial deprivation" of
the liberty retained by prisoners in custody,43 its first step in deciding Miller
was to determine whether a substantial deprivation of retained liberty had
been visited upon the prisoners whose cases were being considered. 44 The
prisoners complaining of the absence of due process had seen their statutory
good time revoked and/or had been sent to punitive segregation units after
38. Id. at 489.
39. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973).
40. Id. at 712.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 713 and n.25.
43. Id. at 713.
44. Miller was a consolidation of six prisoner complaints brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. 1983.
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in-prison disciplinary hearings had determined that they had violated prison
regulations.
The revocation of statutory good time credits operates to lengthen the
time before a prisoner is released, therefore the court analogized this re-
vocation with the revocation of parole.4 5 Since Morrissey had held that the
revocation of parole was a substantial deprivation of liberty which must be
preceded by due process, it followed that the revocation of statutory good time
credits also required due process. 4 6 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit held
that before statutory good time credits could be revoked as a result of an
in-prison disciplinary hearing, procedural due process required that:
1. the prisoner must receive adequate advance written notice of
the charges against him,
2. he must be afforded a fair opportunity to explain his version
of the incident,4 7 and,
3. to insure a degree of impartiality, the factual determination
must be made by a person or persons other than the officer
who reported the infraction. 4"
Similarly, the court of appeals held that the conditions of punitive segregation
were sufficiently more restrictive than the conditions prevailing in the prison's
general population so as to constitute a grievous loss of retained liberty
where the periods of segregation were prolonged. Therefore, the court held
that before a prisoner could be sentenced to prolonged periods of punitive
segregation, the same minimal due process requirements applicable to the re-
vocation of statutory good time were required.
49
The question of the Seventh Circuit's position on the requirement of
counsel is somewhat confusing. The court noted two reasons why the right
to counsel or lay substitute at in-prison disciplinary hearings was doubtful. 50
First, it was noted that Morrissey had not held that the right to counsel was
required at parole revocation hearings. 5 However, just two days before
the Seventh Circuit handed down Miller, the United States Supreme Court in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli12 had held that the question of right to counsel should be
considered on a case by case basis even though counsel would "probably be
undesireable and unnecessary in most . . . ,,53 parole revocation hearings.
Secondly, the court noted that even if the right to counsel had been required
45. 479 F.2d at 715.
46. Id.
47. A subsequent restatement of these minimal requirements on p.716 reveals
that this requirement included the opportunity "to request that witnesses be called or
interviewed." (Emphasis added.)
48. 479 F.2d at 716.
49. Id. at 718.
50. Id. at 715, n.31.
51. Id.
52. 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973).
53. Id. at 1763.
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by Morrissey, that was no authority for the proposition that due process re-
quired the presence of counsel at in-prison disciplinary proceedings. 54
Therefore, it would seem that even if the Seventh Circuit had known of the
Supreme Court's decision in Gagnon, it would not have held that the presence
of counsel at in-prison disciplinary proceedings was mandated by due process.
It is significant that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit repeat-
edly emphasized that the three requirements it listed were the "bare mini-
mum" 55 which was required by procedural due process. The court held that
the maximum requirements mandated by procedural due process for in-pri-
son disciplinary hearings were the six requirements which had been set down
in Morrissey as applicable to parole revocation proceedings. 56 This emphasis
is significant in that it indicates that the court of appeals was not quite sat-
isfied with the "bare minimum" which it had set down but was reluctant to
go further for fear of taking too much discretion from prison officials,
thereby endangering prison discipline and security. That the court of appeals
wanted the assistance of prison officials in determining to what extent the
Morrissey requirements should be made applicable to in-prison disciplinary
proceedings was obvious when it stated:
We do not think it appropriate for us to try to define the consti-
tutional requirements with greater specificity at this time. Rather,
we defer in the first instance to the expertise of the state officials
to specify the appropriate time and form of written notice for
various offenses; the extent to which evidence must be disclosed;
the method for enabling a prisoner to explain or rebut the charges,
including, if appropriate, an indication of the situations in which
he may insist that witnesses be called or at least interviewed; and
the extent to which a written statement of the disposition of
the charge should be made. Unquestionably, if the Morrissey
standards are met, due process will have been afforded. . . .57
Thus, while the Seventh Circuit went further in establishing due process re-
quirements at in-prison disciplinary hearings than did the Second Circuit in
Sostre v. McGinnis, the Seventh Circuit appears to have recognized the same
limitations on its judgment that was so bothersome to the Second Circuit in
Sostre. That limitation is the fact that federal courts do not know what the
ultimate effect of requiring more procedural requirements at in-prison dis-
ciplinary hearings will be. It is possible that specific and far reaching pro-
cedural requirements will help ease the tension which naturally exists between
prisoners and their keepers. On the other hand, the placing of more pro-
cedural requirements on in-prison disciplinary hearings, and defining those re-
quirements with great specificity, necessarily undermines the power of prison
officials to maintain prison discipline and security. The result of going
54. 479 F.2d at 715, n.31.
55. Id. at 715, 718.
56. Id. at 716, 718. For the Morrissey requirements see text at note 38 supra.
57. Id. at 716.
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too far in undermining that power could be chaos. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, after recognizing this limitation, decided that it was
a question for prison officials.5 8  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, after recognizing the same limitation, decided that the question was one
for the federal courts to decide with the benefit of the expertise of prison offi-
cials.59 The dissent in Miller felt that the question should be determined
solely by the courts.
If the majority in Miller felt restrained by the limitation outlined above,
it is clear that the lone dissenter, Chief Judge Swygert, felt none. In his dis-
sent, Judge Swygert argued that all six of the due process requirements which
Morrissey had set down for parole revocation hearings should have been
made applicable to in-prison disciplinary proceedings as well.60 He argued
that the deprivation of retained liberty suffered by prisoners upon the revoca-
tion of stautory good time credits or confinement in punitive segregation was
analogous to the deprivation suffered upon the revocation of parole. 61 He rea-
soned that this was sufficient to hold that all six of the Morrissey requirements
were applicable to in-prison disciplinary proceedings. 6 2 As for the limitation
that had restrained the majority, Chief Judge Swygert argued that:
The state has a legitimate interest in expedited discipline only
when procedure by hearing raises a risk of danger to inmates
or to the prison institution as a whole by widespread violence or
riot.63
Moreover, he argued that since the Seventh Circuit had held that parolees
were entitled to counsel at parole revocation hearings, 64 the right to coun-
sel should also be made applicable to in-prison disciplinary proceedings.
Thus, unlike the majority opinion and the Second Circuit's Sostre decision, the
dissent of Chief Judge Swygert showed absolutely no reluctance to limit the
discretion of prison officials.
IV. WoRKmAN v. KLEINDIENST
6 5
At least one other federal court has read Morrissey in substantially the
same manner as Chief Judge Swygert read it. In Workman v. Kleindienst,66
the District Court for the Western District of Washington, relying on Morris-
sey and Gagnon, held that before a federal prisoner's good time credit can be
revoked, due process requires two separate hearings. First, a preliminary
58. 442 F.2d at 197.
59. 479 F.2d 718, 719.
60. Id. at 721.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 723.
64. Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd in part sub. nom.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973).
65. 2 Prison L. Rptr. 406 (W.D. Wash. July 20, 1973).
66. Id.
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hearing must be held to determine whether there is probable cause to believe
the inmate has committed an infraction of the prison regulations.6 7 The court
held that the minimum requirements necessary to satisfy due process at this
preliminary hearing are:
1. that the hearing be before a person or persons not directly
involved in the case;
2. that the prisoner be given advance notice that the purpose
of the hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause
to believe that he has violated a prison rule or regulation;
3. that the notice state what prison violations have been alleged;
4. that the prisoner may appear and speak in his own behalf;
5. that the prisoner may bring letters, documents or individuals
who can give relevant information to the hearing officer;
6. that on request of the prisoner, persons who have given ad-
verse information may be cross-examined or questioned, unless,
in the opinion of the hearing officer, there is good cause for
non-disclosure of their identities;
7. that a record be made of the proceeding. 68
Based on the information given before this hearing, the hearing officer is re-
quired to determine whether the charges should be dismissed or order a
Good Time Forfeiture Board.
The Good Time Forfeiture Board is the second hearing required by
Workman. At this hearing, the final determination of contested facts is to be
made and the Board is to consider whether forfeiture of good time is war-
ranted.69 The court held that the minimum requirements mandated by due
process at this hearing are:
(1) Written prior notice of claimed violations of prison con-
duct;
(2) Disclosure to inmate of evidence against him;
(3) The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses (unless
the board specifically finds good cause for not allowing confron-
tation);
(4) The opportunity for the inmate to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence;
(5) A "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional
parole board;
(6) A written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for any forfeiture of good time, delivered
to the prisoner with appropriate notice of right to appeal. 70
The court went on to hold that, although there was no right to appointed
counsel, the prisoner did have the right to retained counsel. 71 While this de-
67. Id. at 408.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 409.
71. Id.
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cision is by far the most far reaching in terms of extending procedural due
process to prisoners at in-prison disciplinary proceedings, the court did make
some small concessions to the discretion of prison officials. The court noted
that "the presence of counsel shall in no way inhibit the respective hearing
bodies from exercising great latitude as to evidence to be considered in reach-
ing a decision, 72 and that the hearings were to "be distinguished by their flex-
ibility, balancing always the needs of the institution with the rights of the in-
mates." 7
3
CONCLUSION
As will be recalled, federal courts have traditionally been reluctant to
interfere with the internal discipline of prisons. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in Sostre v. McGinnis, remarked that a federal court de-
termination as to the "effect of equipping prisoners with more elaborate con-
stitutional weapons against the administration of discipline by prison author-
ities . . . -,4 would be mere guesswork. In United States ex. rel. Miller v.
Twomey, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized this limita-
tion and deferred to the expertise of prison officials in determining the extent
to which new procedural due process guarantees should be adopted in the
Seventh Circuit.75 Unless Workman v. Kleindienst is overruled or the well-
intentioned guesswork of the District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington is correct, the penal institutions affected by that decision should ex-
pect trouble.
GEORGE C. SORENSEN
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 442 F.2d at 197.
75. 479 F.2d at 716, 718, 719.
